CONTENTS

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FOREWORD (ABREVIATED) TO THE FIRST (DUTCH) EDITION v
FOREWORD TO THE SECOND (ENGLISH) EDITION x
TRANSLATORS' PREFACE xii
CONTENTS xv
PART I - PROLEGOMENA
INTRODUCTION - THE FIRST WAY OF A TRANSCENDENTAL CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT 3
Meaning as the mode of being of all that is created 4
The direction of philosophical thought to the totality of meaning implies critical self-reflection 5
The supposed reduction of the selfhood to an immanent, subjective pole of thought 6
The transcendence of our selfhood above theoretical thought. The so-called transcendental subject of thought cannot be self-sufficient as a theoretical abstraction 7
How does philosophical thought attain to the Idea of the totality of meaning? 7
The Archimedean point of philosophy and the tendency of philosophical thought towards the Origin 8
The opposition between so-called critical and genetic method is terminologically confusing, because it is not clearly defined in its sense 9
The restlessness of meaning in the tendency of philosophic thought towards the origin 11
The three requirements which the Archimedean point must satisfy 12
The immanence-standpoint in philosophy 12
The immanence-standpoint does not in itself exclude the so-called metaphysical way to that which transcends human thought 13
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We employ the term immanence-philosophy in the widest possible sense 13
The inner problematic situation of the immanence-standpoint 15
Why totality of meaning cannot be found in the coherence of the modal aspects 15
The Archimedean point as concentration-point for philosophic thought 16
Does the so-called transcendental subject of thought satisfy the requirements for the Archimedean point? 16
The theoretical synthesis supposes the modal diversity of meaning of the logical and the non-logical which is its opposite 18
The pitfall in the conception of the so-called transcendental subject of thought as Archimedean point: cosmic diversity of meaning and diversity in the special logical meaning 19
Misunderstanding of the intermodal synthesis of meaning as a transcendental-logical one 19
The necessary religious transcending in the choice of the immanence-standpoint 20
CHAPTER I - THE TRANSCENDENTAL CRITICISM OF THEORETICAL THOUGHT AND THE CENTRAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA FOR PHILOSOPHY 22
§ 1 - The problem of time 22
Rickert's conception of the self-limitation of thought 23
The immanence of all modal aspects of meaning in time 24
The influence of the dialectical ground-motives upon the philosophical conception of time 25
The integral character of cosmic time. The correlation of temporal order and duration, and the subject-object relation in the latter 28
All structures of temporal reality are structures of cosmic time 29
The transcendental Idea and the modal concepts of time. The logical aspect of temporal order and duration 30
No static conception of the supra-temporal. Is the acceptance of a central trans-cosmic time desirable? 32
The eschatological aspect of cosmic time in faith 33
Naïve and theoretical experience of time 33
§ 2 - The transcendental criticism of theoretical thought and the dogma concerning the autonomy of the latter. The second way to a transcendental criticism of philosophy 34
The dogmatic positing of the autonomy of theoretical thought 35
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The different views of the autonomy of theoretical thought and the origin of this difference 35
The dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought as an impediment to philosophical discussion among the various schools 36
The necessity of a transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought as such. The difference in principle between transcendent and transcendental criticism 37
§ 3 - The first transcendental basic problem of theoretical thought. The ‘gegenstand-relation’ versus the subject-object-relation 38
The antithetical structure of the theoretical attitude of thought in its purely intentional character and the origin of the theoretical problem 39
A closer confrontation of the naïve attitude with the theoretical 41
The subject-object-relation in naïve experience 42
The consequences of ignoring the first transcendental basic problem in the traditional conception as to the relation of body and soul in human nature 44
§ 4 - The second transcendental basic problem: the starting-point of theoretical synthesis 45
The impasse of the immanence-standpoint and the source of the theoretical antinomies 45
The various -isms in the theoretical vision of reality 46
The problem of the basic denominator for the theoretical comparison and distinction of the modal aspects 47
The rôle of the -isms in pure mathematics and in logic 47
Provisional delimitation of the moral aspect 48
The starting-point of theoretical synthesis in the Kantian critique of knowledge 49
The problem of the starting-point and the way of critical self-reflection in theoretical thought 51
§ 5 - The third transcendental basic problem of the critique of theoretical thought and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception 52
The alleged vicious circle in our transcendental criticism 56
What is religion? 57
The impossibility of a phenomenology of religion. The ex-sistent character of the ego as the religious centre of existence 57
The supra-individual character of the starting-point 59
The meaning of the central command of love 60
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The spirit of community and the religious basic motive 61
The Greek form-matter-motive and the modern Humanistic motive of nature and freedom 61
Sin as privatio and as dynamis. No dialectical relation between creation and fall 63
The dialectical character of the apostate ground-motives. Religious and theoretic dialectic 64
The uncritical character of the attempts to bridge the religious antithesis in a dialectical starting-point by a theoretical dialectic 64
The religious dialectic in the scholastic motive of nature and grace 65
The ascription of the primacy to one of the antithetic components of the dialectical ground-motive 66
The meaning of each of the antithetic components of a dialectic ground-motive is dependent upon that of the other 68
§ 6 - The transcendental ground-idea of philosophy 68
The three transcendental Ideas of theoretical thought, through the medium of which the religious basic motive controls this thought 68
The triunity of the transcendental ground-Idea 69
The transcendental critique of theoretical thought and the dogmatic exclusivism of the philosophical schools 70
The metaphysical-analogical concept of totality and the transcendental Idea of the totality of meaning. Transcendental critique of the metaphysical conception of the analogia entis 71
The so-called logical formalizing of the concept of totality and the philosophical Idea of totality 73
The principle of the Origin and the continuity-principle in Cohen's philosophy 74
Being and Validity and the critical preliminary question as to the meaning of these concepts 76
Levelling of the modal diversity of meaning in the generic concept rests upon an uncritical misjudgment of the special meaning in the logical aspect 77
The masking of the transcendental ground-Idea by the so-called dialectical logic. Theodor Litt 77
Modal diversity and radical identity of meaning. Logical identity has only model meaning. Parmenides 79
§ 7 - The transcendental ground-idea as hypothesis of philosophy 82
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The theoretical character of the transcendental ground-Idea and its relation to naïve experience 82
The datum of naïve experience as a philosophical problem 83
The naïve concept of the thing and the special scientific concept of function 83
Philosophy, special science, and naïve experience 84
‘Reflexive’ thought versus ‘objective’ thought in recent philosophy. The confusion of ‘object’ and ‘Gegenstand’ in this opposition 86
The transcendental ground-Idea as hypothesis of philosophy 86
The relation of transcendent and transcendental points of views and the original meaning of the transcendental motive 88
Kant's opinion concerning the transcendental Ideas. Why did Kant fail to conceive of these Ideas as ὑπόϑεσις of his critiques 89
It was Fichte who tried to remove the difficulties involved in the Kantian dualistic conception 90
The decline of the transcendental motive in the Marburg methodological logicism, in Litt's conception of reflexive thought, and in Husserl's ‘egology’ 91
The basic Idea of philosophy remains a subjective ὑπόϑεσις The criterion of truth and relativism 91
The transcendental limits of philosophy and the criterion of speculative metaphysics 92
Calvin's verdict against this metaphysics 93
§ 8 - The transcendental ground-idea of philosophy as cosmonomic idea (wetsidee) 93
The Origin of this terminology 93
Objections against the term ‘cosmonomic Idea’ and the grounds for maintaining it 94
Misunderstanding of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea as meaning-idealism 96
Cosmonomic Idea, modal concept of laws and modal concept of subject and object 97
The dependence of the modal concepts of law, subject and object upon the cosmonomic Idea 98
§ 9 - The symbol of the refraction of light. The cosmic order of time and the cosmological principle of sovereignty in its proper orbit. The modal aspects of reality as modal law-spheres 99
The lex as boundary between the ‘Being’ of God and the ‘meaning’ of the creation 99
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The logical function of thought in apostasy 100
The re-formation of the cosmonomic Idea by the central motive of the Christian religion 101
The modal law-spheres and their sphere-sovereignty 102
Christian religion does not allow of any absolutizing with respect to its fulness of meaning 104
Sphere-sovereignty of the modal aspects in their inter-modal coherence of meaning as a philosophical basic problem 104
Potentiality and actuality in cosmic time 105
Cosmic time and the refraction of meaning. Why can the totality of meaning disclose itself in time only in refraction and coherence of modalities? 105
The logical function is not relative in a logical but in a cosmic sense 106
The elimination of cosmic time-order in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 107
§ 10 - The importance of our cosmonomic idea in respect to the modal concepts of laws and their subjects 108
Modal concepts of the lex and its subject. The subject as subject to laws 108
The disturbance of the meaning of the concepts of the modal laws and their subjects in the Humanistic immanence-philosophy 108
Rationalism as absolutizing of the general rule, irrationalism as absolutizing of individual subjectivity 110
The concept of the subject in the irrationalistic phenomenology and philosophy of existence 111
The concept of the lex and the subject in ancient Greek thought and its dependence on the Greek form-matter-motive 112
CHAPTER II - PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE- AND WORLD-VIEW 114
§ 1 - The antithetic position of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea in respect to the immanence-philosophy and the postulate of the historical continuity in philosophical thought contained in the idea of the ‘philosophia perennis’ 114
The basis of cooperation between Christian thought and the different trends of immanence-philosophy 114
A popular argument against the possibility of Christian science and philosophy 115
Partial truths are not self-sufficient. Every partial truth is dependent upon truth in its totality of meaning 116
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The undeniable states of affairs in the structure of temporal reality 116
The idea of the perennial philosophy 117
How is the idea of the ‘philosophia perennis’ to be understood? Philosophic thought and historical development 118
What is permanent, and what is subjected to the historical development of thought. The scholastic standpoint of accommodation forever condemned 119
The conception of the antithesis of standpoints in the immanence-philosophy as ‘Weltanschauungslehre’ (theory of life- and world-views) 120
The consequence of our transcendental critique for the history of philosophy 122
The only possible ultimate antithesis in philosophy 123
§ 2 - The distinction between philosophy and life- and world-view and the criterion 124
The boundaries between philosophy and a life- and world-view as seen from the immanence-standpoint. Disagreement as to the criterion 124
Life- and world-view as an ‘individual impression of life’, Theodor Litt and Georg Simmel 126
The relationship as seen from the Christian transcendence-standpoint 127
§ 3 - The neutrality-postulate and the ‘theory of life and world-views’ 128
Rickert's defence of the neutrality-postulate 129
Criticism of the fundamentals of the ‘Weltanschauungslehre’ 134
Immanent antinomy in Rickert's philosophy of values 135
The test of the transcendental ground-Idea 136
The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not judge about matters over which no judgment belongs to man, but leads to fundamental self-criticism of the thinker 137
§ 4 - Sequel: The pretended self-guarantee of theoretical truth 138
Litt's argument concerning the self-guarantee of theoretical truth 138
Critique of Litt's conception 141
The first pitfall in Litt's demonstration: the unconditional character of the ‘transcendental cogito’ 142
The second pitfall: the opposition of transcendental thought and full reality 143
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The ‘self-refutation of scepticism’ reduced to its true proportion 144
The test of the transcendental ground-Idea 147
§ 5 - The transcendental ground-idea and the meaning of truth 148
The impossibility of an authentic religiously neutral theory of the life- and world-views. The concept of truth is never purely theoretical with respect to its meaning 148
Immanence-philosophy recognizes no norm of truth above its transcendental ground-Idea 150
The distinction between theoretical and a-theoretical judgments. The inner contradiction of a restriction of the validity of truth to the former 151
Theoretical and non-theoretical judgments. The latter are never a-logical, but merely non-‘gegenständlich’ 153
Litt's distinction between theoretical and ‘weltanschauliche’ truth and the self-refutation of this distinction in the sense in which Litt intends it 154
The inner contradiction of this dualism. The meaninglessness of judgments, which are alleged not to be subjected to the norm of truth 154
§ 6 - Closer determination of the relation between philosophy and a life- and world-view 156
The life- and world-view is no system and cannot be made a system without affecting its essence 157
What is the meaning of the concept ‘universal-validity’? The Kantian conception is determined by the critical Humanist immanence-standpoint 158
The possibility of universally valid judgments depends on the universal supra-subjective validity of the structural laws of human experience 160
The universal validity of a correct judgment of perception 161
The criterion of universal validity of a judgment concerning supra-theoretical states of affairs and the unconditional validity of the religious law of concentration of human experience 162
The so-called ‘transcendental consciousness’ as hypostatization of theoretical human thought in its general apostasy from the fulness of meaning of truth 163
Impurity of the opposition ‘universal-validity’ and individuality as a contradictory one 164
Neither life- and world-view, nor philosophy is to be understood individualistically 164
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PART II - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BASIC ANTINOMY IN THE COSMONOMIC IDEA OF HUMANISTIC IMMANENCE-PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER I - THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE HUMANISTIC TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA AND THE INTRINSIC POLARITY BETWEEN THE CLASSICAL SCIENCE-IDEAL AND THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY 169
§ 1 - Introduction. Humanistic philosophy and the humanistic view of life and the world 169
The undermining of the personal sense of responsibility in the religious commitment 170
The synthetic standpoint of Thomistic philosophy and the disruption of this synthesis by the nominalism of late scholasticism 172
The Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy and medieval culture 173
The integral and radical character of the religious ground-motive of creation, the fall and redemption in the Biblical sense 173
Sin and the dialectical conception of guilt in Greek and Humanistic philosophy 175
Once again the inner reformation of philosophic thought 176
The speculative logos-theory 177
Philosophy as ancilla theologiae in Augustinian scholasticism 177
The scholastic character of Augustine's cosmonomic Idea 178
The entrance of the dialectical ground-motive of nature and grace in Christian scholasticism 179
Creation as a natural truth in Thomas' theologia naturalis 180
The elimination of the integral and radical meaning of the Biblical motive of creation in Thomas' metaphysics 180
The elimination of the radical meaning of fall and redemption. The neo-Platonic Augustinian trend in Thomas' natural theology 181
The Aristotelian cosmonomic Idea 181
The content of the Thomistic cosmonomic Idea 182
The intrinsic dialectic of the scholastic basic motive of nature and grace and the nominalism of the fourteenth century 183
The ‘primacy of the will’ in the nominalistic school of thought versus the ‘primacy of the intellect’ in the realistic metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. There is no essential connection between realism and the primacy of the intellect 185
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The primacy of the will in the cosmonomic Idea of Augustine 185
The potestas Dei absoluta in Duns Scotus and William of Occam 186
The nominalistic conception of the potestas Dei absoluta entirely contrary to its own intention places God's Creative Will under the boundary-line of the lex 187
The nominalistic critique effectuated a radical disruption between the Christian and pagan motives in medieval scholasticism 187
Secularization of nominalism in late scholasticism 188
§ 2 - The rise of humanistic philosophical thought 188
The collapse of the ecclesiastically unified culture 189
A closer consideration of the religious ground-motive of Humanism: the motive of nature and freedom 190
The ambiguity of the Humanistic motive of freedom 190
The new ideal of personality of the Renaissance 191
The motive of the domination of nature and the ambiguity of the nature-motive 192
The πέϱας and the ἄπειϱον. The antithesis with the ancient ideal of life 194
The Cartesian ‘Cogito’ in contra-distinction to the theoretical nous as the Archimedian point of Greek metaphysics 195
There is no relationship between Descartes' and Augustine's Archimedean point. The misconception of the Jansenists of Port Royal on this issue 196
The connection between Descartes' methodological scepticism and the discovery of analytical geometry. The creation-motive in the Cartesian ‘cogito’ 197
The polar tension between the ideal of personality and the ideal of science in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental Idea 198
The tendency towards infinity in Giordiano Bruno's pantheism 199
§ 3 - The postulate of continuity in the humanistic science-ideal and the basic antinomy in the humanistic cosmonomic idea 200
The concept of substance in the new Humanistic metaphysics is quite different from the Aristotelian-Thomistic or Platonic one 201
The lex continui in Leibniz and the Marburg school of Neo-Kantians 204
The fundamental antinomy in the basic structure of the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea 204
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The supposed solution of this antinomy in transcendental thought 205
The tendency of continuity in the freedom-motive of the ideal of personality 206
§ 4 - A diorama of the dialectical development of humanistic philosophy after Kant. The process of religious uprooting and the actuality of our transcendental critique 207
The origination of a new historical science-ideal out of an irrationalistic and universalistic turn in the freedom-motive 207
The polar tension between the historistic ideal of science and the idealistic dialectic of Hegel's freedom-idealism 208
The rise of positivistic sociology and the transformation of the historical method of thought into a natural scientific one 209
The transformation of historicism into naturalistic evolutionism 210
The first expression of the spiritual disintegrating process in Historicism. Nietzsche's religion of power 210
The rôle of neo-Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism in the crisis of historicism 212
The classic ideal of science and the development of 20th century physics. The neo-positivism of the Vienna school 212
Husserl's eidetic logic and phenomenology 213
The attitude of decline in Spengler's philosophy of history and in Humanistic existentialism 214
The actuality of our transcendental critique of theoretical thought 215
CHAPTER II - THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY AND THE NATURAL SCIENCE-IDEAL IN THE FIRST TYPES OF THEIR MUTUAL POLAR TENSION UNDER THE PRIMACY OF THE FORMER 216
§ 1 - The naturalistic-monistic and the dualistic type of transcendental ground-idea under the primacy of the science-ideal. Its connection with the pessimistic and semi-pessimistic view of life 216
The conflict between Descartes and Hobbes as the first expression of the basic antinomy in the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea 216
Hobbes' pessimism and its connection with his ascription of primacy to the science-ideal. Virtue and necessity in Macchiavelli 217
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The dualism between thought and extension in Descartes 218
The background of the ideal of personality in this dualism 218
The metaphysical problem concerning the relation between soul and body acquires a new significance in the light of the transcendental Humanist ground-Idea 219
The deeper ground of Descartes' partial indeterminism 220
The antinomy in Hobbes' naturalistic conception of thought in the light of the deterministic ideal of science. The ideae innatae of Descartes 221
§ 2 - The mathematical-idealistic type of humanist transcendental ground-idea 223
The supposed Thomistic-Aristotelian traits in Leibniz' philosophy 223
The secularization of the motive of nature and grace in Leibniz' philosophy 226
The refinement of the postulate of continuity in the science-ideal by means of Leibniz' mathematical concept of function.
The discovery of differential and integral calculus 227
The two roots of Leibniz' philosophy. The misunderstanding in Schmalenbach concerning the Calvinistic origin of Leibniz' individualism 229
Leibniz' concept of force and the motive of activity in the ideal of personality 230
Primacy of the mathematical science-ideal in Leibniz' transcendental ground-Idea 232
Leibniz' Humanistic theism 234
Logicization of the dynamical tendency in the ideal of personality 234
Leibniz' intellectual determinism and his doctrine of innate Ideas in the light of the lex continui 236
§ 3 - The moderate nominalism in Leibniz' conception of ideas. The idea as symbol of relations and as the concept of law of the rationalistic ideal of science 240
The apparent fight against nominalism in the third book of Leibniz' ‘Nouveaux Essais’ 241
Leibniz' nominalistic standpoint in his treatise concerning the philosophical style of Nizolius (1670) 244
The notion of the logical alphabet and the symbolical conception of ideas 245
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§ 4 - The modal aspects of reality as modi of mathematical thought 247
Phenomenon and noumenon in Leibniz' metaphysics; ‘verités de raison’ and ‘verités de fait’. Leibniz' mathematical idealism 249
Spinoza and Leibniz. Wolff's eradication of the distinction between necessary and contingent truths 250
§ 5 - The basic antinomy in the humanistic transcendental ground-idea in its mathematical-idealistic type and the relation of this type to the optimistic life- and world-view 252
The Theodicy with its apparent reconciliation of the ideals of science and personality. The optimism of Leibniz 252
The deceptive formulation of the polar tension between the ideal of science and that of personality in the terminology of the Christian doctrine of faith 253
The basic antinomy in the Humanistic transcendental ground-Idea acquires in Leibniz the mathematical form of the antinomy of the actual infinity 255
‘Metaphysical evil’ as an eternal necessary truth in creative mathematical thought 256
Metaphysical evil as the root of physical and moral evil (sin!) 258
How Leibniz attempted to resolve metaphysical evil into the continuity of infinite mathematical analysis 259
Leibniz and Bayle 260
CHAPTER III - THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY AND THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE IN THE CRITICAL TRANSITION TO THE PRIMACY OF THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY 262
§ 1 - The psychological turn in the science-ideal and its transcendental idea of origin 262
The psychological turn in the ideal of science in empiricism since Locke 262
The inner antinomy in Locke's psychological dualism 264
Locke maintains the mathematical science-ideal with its creation-motive, though in a limited sphere 267
The tendency toward the origin in Locke's opposition to the innate Ideas, and the transcendental Idea of origin in Locke's epistemology 268
The distinction between the knowledge of facts and the knowledge of the necessary relations between concepts 269
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§ 2 - The monistic psychological type of the humanistic transcendental ground-idea under the primacy of the science-ideal 271
The psychologized conception of the science-ideal in Hume. Once again the nominalistic trait in the ideal of science 272
Hume and Pyrrhonic scepticism. Sextus Empiricus 275
Sceptical doubt in Hume, as in Descartes, has only methodological significance 275
The criterion of truth 276
The natural and philosophical relations. The laws of association 277
§ 3 - The transition of the creation-motive in the science-ideal to psychological thought. Hume's criticism of mathematics 280
Contradictory interpretations of Hume's criticism of mathematics 280
The method of solving this controversy 282
Hume drew the full consequences of his ‘psychologistic’ nominalism with respect to mathematics 283
Hume's psychologistic concept of space. Space as a complex of coloured points (minima sensibilia) 284
Psychologizing of the mathematical concept of equality 285
The position of arithmetic in Hume's sensationalism 287
Hume's retrogression into the Lockian conception of mathematics remains completely inexplicable on the sensationalistic basis of his system 288
§ 4 - The dissolution of the ideals of science and of personality by the psychologistic critique 289
Hume's criticism of the concept of substance and his interpretation of naïve experience 289
The creative function of imagination and the way in which the creation-motive of the Humanistic ideal of science is transmitted to psychological thought 292
Hume destroys the metaphysical foundation of the rationalist ideal of personality 294
The radical self-dissolution of the ideals of science and of personality in Hume's philosophy 296
§ 5 - Continuation: The criticism of the principle of causality as a critique of experience 297
The problem pertaining to the necessary connection of cause and effect is to Hume the problem of the origin of natural laws as such 298
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According to Hume, the law of causality is only to be maintained as a psychical law of association. Nevertheless, every legitimate foundation for the ideal of science in a mathematical physical sense is lacking 299
The way in which Hume's Critique finally undermines the foundations of his own psychological science-ideal 299
Hume disregards the synthesis of logical and psychical meaning in his psychological basic denominator 300
§ 6 - The prelude to the shifting of the primacy to the ideal of personality 302
The extension of the psychologized science-ideal over the modal boundaries of meaning of the aesthetic, juridical, moral and faith-aspects 302
The cooperation between the associations of ideas and those of passions 304
The way in which Hume's psychologized ideal of science destroys the conception of freedom of the will in the sense of the mathematical ideal of science 305
The prelude to the shift of primacy to the ideal of personality 306
Hume withdraws morality from the science-ideal. Primacy of the moral feeling 307
Hume's attack upon the rationalistic theory of Humanist natural law and upon its construction of the social contract. Vico and Montesquieu 310
§ 7 - The crisis in the conflict between the ideal of science and that of personality in Rousseau 313
Rousseau's religion of sentiment and his estrangement from Hume 316
Optimism and pessimism in their new relation in Rousseau 317
Locke and Rousseau. The contrast between innate human rights and inalienable rights of the citizen 318
The ideal of personality acquires the primacy in Rousseau's construction of the social contract 319
The antinomy between the natural rights of man and the rights of citizen. Rousseau's attempt to solve it 321
The origin of this antinomy is again to be found in the tension between the ideal of science and that of personality 323
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CHAPTER IV - THE LINE OF DEMARCATION BETWEEN THE IDEALS OF SCIENCE AND OF PERSONALITY IN KANT. THE (CRITICAL) DUALIST IDEALISTIC TYPE OF TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA UNDER THE PRIMACY OF THE HUMANIST IDEAL OF PERSONALITY 325
§ 1 - Introduction. The misconception of Kant's transcendental idealism as the philosophic expression of the spirit of reformation 325
Kroner's view of the relation of Kant's transcendental idealism to the Christian religion 325
Is Kant the philosopher of the Reformation? Przywara 326
The Idea of freedom as both the religious totality and origin of meaning: Höningswald 328
§ 2 - The development of the conflict between the ideal of personality and that of science in the first phase of Kant's thought up until his inaugural oration of 1770 330
The motives of the preceding Humanistic philosophy. The manner in which Kant wrestles with their mutual tension. The influence of Pietism 330
In his natural scientific conception, Kant remained a faithful adherent of the ideal of science; his reverence for the spirit of the ‘Enlightenment’ 331
The influence of Rousseau and Hume 332
Kant's first period: Kant as an independent supporter of the metaphysics of Leibniz and Wolff. The primacy of the mathematical science-ideal in the first conception of his transcendental ground-Idea 335
Kant's second period: the methodological line of demarcation between mathematics and metaphysics. The influence of Newton and English psychologism 336
The rupture between the metaphysics of the science-ideal and moral philosophy in this period of Kant's thought 338
Influence of Crusius 339
Third period: the dominating influence of Hume and Rousseau. Complete emancipation of the ideal of personality from the metaphysics of the science-ideal 340
The transitional phase in Kant's thought until 1770 341
The problem of the mathematical antinomies. Leibniz' and Newton's conception of space and time 343
§ 3 - The further development of this conflict and the origination of the real critical philosophy 344
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The separation of understanding and sensibility in Kant's inaugural address of 1770 344
The development of Kant's new conception of the ideal of personality. Earlier optimism is replaced by a radical pessimism with respect to the sensory nature of man 346
The new conception of the ideal of personality as ὑπόϑεσις in the transition to the critical standpoint 351
The ‘Dialectic of Pure Reason’ as the heart of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 353
§ 4 - The antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality in the critique of pure reason 354
The deepest tendencies of Kant's Copernican revolution in epistemology are brought to light by the ascription of primacy to the ideal of personality resulting in a new form of the Humanistic ground-Idea 355
The dualistic type of the Kantian transcendental ground-Idea 357
In Kant's transcendental dualistic ground-Idea the basic antinomy between the ideals of science and of personality assumes a form which was to become the point of departure for all the subsequent attempts made by post-Kantian idealism to conquer this dualism 358
The expression of this dualism in the antithesis of natural laws and norms 359
The form-matter schema in Kant's epistemology as an expression of the inner antinomy of his dualistic transcendental ground-Idea 360
The function of the transcendental Ideas of theoretical reason 362
Kant's shifting of the Archimedean point of Humanist philosophy is clearly evident from his critique of metaphysical psychology, in which self-consciousness had identified itself with mathematical thought 365
Kant's criticism of ‘rational cosmology’ (natural metaphysics) in the light of the transcendental trend of the cosmological Ideas 367
The intervention of the ideal of personality in Kant's solution of the so-called dynamical antinomies and the insoluble antinomy in Kant's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea 369
Within the cadre of Kant's transcendental ground-Idea the natural ‘Ding an sich’ can no longer be maintained. The depreciation of the theoretical Idea of God 372
§ 5 - The development of the basic antinomy in the ‘critique of practical reason’ 372
Autos and nomos in Kant's Idea of autonomy 373
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The dualistic division between the ideal of science and the ideal of personality delivers the latter into the hands of a logical formalism 374
The precise definition of the principle of autonomy through the Idea of personality as ‘end in itself’ 376
In the application of Kant's categorical imperative to concrete actions, the dualism between ‘nature’ (ideal of science) and ‘freedom’ (ideal of personality) becomes an antinomy 378
Kant's characterization of Leibniz' conception of free personality as ‘automaton spirituale’ 380
Kroner's conception of the origin of the antinomy in Kant's doctrine of ‘pure will’ as ‘causa noumenon’ 381
The antinomy between nature and freedom in Kant's concept of the highest good 381
Kant formulates the antinomy between the ideal of science and that of personality as it is implied in the concept of the highest good as the ‘antinomy of practical reason’ 383
In Kant's Idea of God the ideal of personality dominates the ideal of science 384
§ 6 - The development of the basic antinomy in the critique of judgment 385
The attempt to resolve the dualism between the ideal of science and that of personality in the Critique of Judgment. The problem of individuality 385
Kant's rationalistic conception of individuality 387
The idea of teleology in nature 388
The law of specification as the regulative principle of the transcendental faculty of judgment for the contemplation of nature 389
The reason why the ‘Critique of Judgment’ cannot resolve the basic discord in Kant's Archimedean point 390
The same antinomy which intrinsically destroys the Idea of the ‘homo noumenon’ recurs in the principle of teleological judgment 393
The fictitious character of the teleological view of nature follows directly from Kant's transcendental ground-Idea 395
The origin of the antinomy of the faculty of teleological judgment in the light of Kant's cosmonomic Idea 396
The basic antinomy between the ideals of science and personality in Kant is everywhere crystallized in the form-matter schema. A synopsis of the development of this antinomy in the three Critiques 400
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Kant's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea lacks an unequivocal Archimedean point and an unequivocal Idea of the totality of meaning 402
CHAPTER V - THE TENSION BETWEEN THE IDEAL OF SCIENCE AND THAT OF PERSONALITY IN THE INDENTITY-PHILOSOPHY OF POST-KANTIAN FREEDOM-IDEALISM 403
§ 1 - The transitional period between critical idealism and monistic freedom-idealism. From Maimon to Fichte 403
Maimon's attempt at a solution of the antinomy in Kant's form-matter scheme by means of Leibniz' principle of continuity 404
Maimon's falling away from the veritable transcendental motive. How the transcendental Idea loses for him its direction toward Kant's ideal of personality 405
Maimon's mathematical Criticism and the Marburg school among the Neo-Kantians 406
The problem as to the relation between the universal and the particular in knowledge within the domain of Kant's apriori forms of consciousness. Maimon's cosmonomic Idea 408
In the explanation of his ‘principle of determinability’ Maimon starts from three fundamentally different ways in which thought can combine a manifold of ‘objects of consciousness’ into a logical unity 409
The break between form and sensory matter of knowledge. Maimon's later critical scepticism with respect to Kant's concept of experience 410
Within the limits of the critical standpoint, the mathematical science-ideal appears unable to overcome Kant's dualism between sensibility and reason 412
§ 2 - The continuity-postulate in the new conception of the ideal of personality and the genesis of the dialectical philosophy in Fichte's first ‘theoretische wissenschaftslehre’ (1794) 413
The ground-motive of Fichte's first ‘Wissenschaftslehre’. The creative moment in the personality-ideal 413
The Archimedean point in Fichte's transcendental ground-Idea 415
Fichte's ‘absolute ego’ as origin and totality of all cosmic diversity of meaning is nothing but the hypostatization of the moral function 416
Fichte's attempt at a transcendental deduction of the Kantian forms of thought from the self-consciousness 418
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Dialectical thought, dominated by the ideal of personality, usurps the task of the cosmic order 420
To Fichte the ‘absolute ego’ remains outside the dialectical system. The Idea of the absolute ego as ethical task 422
Fichte attempts to give an account of the possibility of theoretical knowledge by referring the latter to the selfhood. Why this attempt cannot succeed on Fichte's immanence-standpoint 423
Transcendental deduction of the Kantian categories of relation from self-consciousness. The science-ideal is here derived from the ideal of personality 424
The domination of the continuity-postulate of the ideal of personality. The Humanist transcendental ground-Idea in its transcendental monist-moralistic type 426
Productive imagination is to Fichte the creative origin of sensory matter 426
Fichte conceives of the productive imagination as an unconscious function of reason 429
In his concept of the productive imagination, Fichte does not penetrate to pre-theoretical cosmic self-consciousness but remains involved in Kant's functionalistic view of knowledge 431
Fichte's doctrine of the productive imagination and Heidegger's interpretation of Kant 434
§ 3 - The tension between the ideals of science and personality in Fichte's ‘praktische wissenschaftslehre’ (1794) 435
Fichte refers the impulse toward sensory experience to the moral function of personality, in which the ideal of personality is concentrated 436
The infinite and unlimited ego as moral striving. Elimination also of Kant's practical concept of substance. The ego as infinite creative activity is identified with Kant's categorical imperative 437
The ‘fatalism’ so keenly opposed by Fichte is nothing but the science-ideal of the ‘Aufklärung’, dominating the ideal of personality 440
The dialectical line of thought of the practical doctrine of science: feeling, intuition, longing, approbation, absolute impulse (categorical imperative) 442
The categorical imperative as the absolute impulse that is grounded in itself 446
Fichte's dithyramb on the ideal of personality: ‘Ueber die Würde des Menschen’ (On the dignity of man) 447
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The passion for power in Fichte's ideal of personality. The science-ideal converts itself into a titanic ideal of culture 448
The antinomy between the science-ideal and personality-ideal has actually converted itself in Fichte's first period into an antinomy between Idea and sense within the personality-ideal itself 450
CHAPTER VI - THE VICTORY OF THE IRRATIONALIST OVER THE RATIONALIST CONCEPTION OF THE HUMANISTIC TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA. THE IDEAL OF PERSONALITY IN ITS IRRATIONALIST TURN IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE 451
§ 1 - The transition to irrationalism in Fichte's third period under the influence of the movement of the ‘sturm und drang’ (‘storm and stress’) 451
Fichte's relation to ‘Sturm und Drang’ 451
The irrationalist view of the individuality of genius. The irrationalist turn in the ideal of personality 453
Tension between the irrationalist conception of freedom and the science-ideal in its Leibnizian form in Herder. The antinomy is sought in ‘life’ itself. The Faust- and the Prometheus-motif 453
The irrationalist Idea of humanity and the appreciation of individuality in history 454
Fichte's third period and the influence of Jacobi. Transcendental philosophy in contrast with life-experience. The primacy of life and feeling 455
Hegel as opposed to the philosophy of life and feeling 457
Kant's sensory matter of experience is now the ‘true reality’ to Fichte 457
Recognition of the individual value of the empirical as such. Fichte's estimation of individuality contrasted with that of Kant. Individualizing of the categorical imperative 460
No radical irrationalism in Fichte's third period 461
§ 2 - Aesthetic irrationalism in the humanistic ideal of personality. The ideal of the ‘beautiful soul’. Elaboration of the irrationalist freedom-motive in the modern philosophy of life and its polar tension with the science-ideal 462
Schiller and Kant's ‘Critique of aesthetic Judgment’. Aesthetic idealism. The influence of Shaftesbury 462
The ideal of ‘the beautiful soul’ 463
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The ‘morality of genius’ in early Romanticism 465
The tension of the ideals of science and personality in Nietzsche's development. Biologizing of the science-ideal (Darwin) 465
The relationship of αὐτός and νόμος in the irrationalist ideal of personality. Dialectical character of the philosophy of life. Modern dialectical phenomenology 466
The types of the irrationalist cosmonomic Idea of Humanistic thought 467
§ 3 - The genesis of a new concept of science from the humanistic ideal of personality in its irrationalist types. Fichte's fourth period 467
Orientation of a new science-ideal to the science of history 468
Fichte in his fourth period and the South-West-German school of Neo-Kantianism 469
Hegel's supposed ‘rationalism’ 470
‘Intellectual intuition’ in Schelling 471
Hegel's new dialectical logic and its historical orientation 472
The problem of the ‘Realität der Geisterwelt’ (reality of the world of spirits) 473
Trans-personalist turn in the ideal of personality. The new conception of the ‘ordo ordinans’ in Fichte's pantheistic metaphysics 474
Fichte's basic denominator for the aspects of meaning becomes historical in character. Fichte's philosophy of history 476
Natural individuality must be annihilated in the historical process by the individuality of the spirit 478
Individuality and Society 478
Abandonment of the Critical form-matter schema 479
Fichte's logic of historical thought 481
Fichte's new historical concept of time 485
In the ‘Staatslehre’ of 1813, Fichte anticipates the ‘cultural-historical’ method of the South-West-German school of Neo-Kantianism. The synthesis of nature and freedom in the concept of the ‘free force’ 486
The ‘hidden conformity to law’ of historical development. The irrationalist concept of the law 488
Irrationalizing of the divine world-plan 489
The concept of the ‘highly gifted people’ (das geniale Volk) 491
The inner antinomies in this irrationalist logic of history 492
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Law and individuality 493
The ‘historical nationality’ as ‘true reality’ contrasted with the state as conceptual abstraction 494
PART III - CONCLUSION AND TRANSITION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSITIVE CONTENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA
CHAPTER I - THE ANTITHETICAL AND SYNTHETICAL STANDPOINTS IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 499
§ 1 - A systematic presentation of the antithesis between the basic structure of the christian and that of the various types of humanistic transcendental ground-idea 499
Schema of the basic structure and the polar types of the Humanistic cosmonomic Idea, in confrontation with the Christian ground-Idea 501
§ 2 - The attempts to synthesize christian faith with immanence-philosophy before and after the reformation 508
The consequences of the synthetic standpoint for Christian doctrine and for the study of philosophy in patristic and scholastic thought 508
The cleft between ‘faith’ and ‘thought’ is only a cleft between the Christian faith and immanence-philosophy 509
The false conception concerning the relationship between Christian revelation and science. Accommodated immanence-philosophy as ancilla theologiae 510
The consequence of the Reformation for scientific thought 511
The after-effect of the nominalistic dualism in Luther's spiritualistic distinction between the Law and the Gospel 511
The scholastic philosophy of Melanchton. Melanchton and Leibniz 513
Melanchton did not break radically with immanence-philosophy 515
Why a radical Christian philosophy can only develop in the line of Calvin's religious starting-point 515
The cosmonomic Idea of Calvin versus the Aristotelian-Thomistic one 518
Calvin's Idea of the Law versus Brunner's irrationalistic and dualistic standpoint 519
There is no dualism between ‘gratia communis’ and ‘gratia particularis’ 523
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Abraham Kuyper and his often misunderstood idea of antithesis 523
Why I reject the term ‘Calvinistic philosophy’ 524
The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea and Blondelism 525
The significance of the philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea for a philosophic contact between the different schools 526
CHAPTER II - THE SYSTEMATIC PLAN OF OUR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS AND A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE COSMONOMIC IDEA TO THE SPECIAL SCIENCES 528
§ 1 - The so-called divisions of systematic philosophy in the light of the transcendental ground-idea 528
The fundamental significance of the transcendental ground-Idea for all attempts made in Humanistic immanence-philosophy to classify the problems of philosophy 528
Windelband's opinion concerning the necessity of dividing philosophy into a theoretical and a practical section 531
The distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in Greek thought 532
The sophistic distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy in the light of the Greek motive of form and matter 533
The axiological turn of this distinction. The primacy of theoretical philosophy versus the primacy of practical philosophy 536
The primacy of practical knowledge in the naturalistic-nominalistic trends of Greek immanence-philosophy 538
In Greek immanence-philosophy, the necessity of ascribing primacy to the theoretical or to the practical reason is connected with the dialectical form-matter motive 539
Why we cannot divide philosophy into a theoretical and a practical 540
§ 2 - The systematic development of the philosophy of the cosmonomic idea in accordance with indissolubly cohering themata 541
The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not recognize any dualistic division of philosophy. The themata develop the same philosophical basic problem in moments which are united in the transcendental ground-Idea, in its relation to the different structures of cosmic time. These moments are inseparably linked together 542
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The philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea does not recognize any other theoretical foundation than the transcendental critique of philosophical thought 543
§ 3 - A closer examination of the relationship between philosophy and the special sciences 545
The separation of philosophy and the special sciences from the standpoint of modern Humanism 546
The intrinsic untenability of a separation between science and philosophy 548
The impossibility of drawing a line of demarcation between philosophical and scientific thought in mathematics, in order to make this special science autonomous with respect to philosophy 549
The positivistic-nominalistic conception of the merely technical character of constructive scientific concepts and methods 550
The positivistic view of reality versus the jural facts 551
The modal-functional and the typical structures of reality 552
The absolutization of the concept of function and the illegitimate introduction of a specific structural concept of individuality as a functional one 555
The dependence of empirical sciences upon the typical structures of individuality. The revolution of physics in the 20th century 556
The defence of the autonomy of the special sciences from the so-called critical-realist standpoint 559
Experiments do not disclose a static reality, given independently of logical thought; rather they point to the solution of questions concerning an aspect of reality which, under the direction of theoretical thought, is involved in a process of enrichment and opening of its meaning 561
The appeal to reality in scientific investigation is never philosophically and religiously neutral. Historicism in science 562
The conflict between the functionalistic-mechanistic, the neo-vitalistic and holistic trends in modern biology 564
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